International Summer School

Once you have been offered a place on the programme, we will contact you and ask you to submit your top three research project choices. You may select projects from more than one humanities subject area (History, Archaeology, Scottish Studies, Classics, Information Studies, Philosophy, and Gender Studies). Your allocated research project will be confirmed in April.

1. Engaging with Philosophy through Popular Media
2. Understanding Misinformation: Perspectives from Philosophy
3. The Philosophy of Trusting Chat GPT
4. Philosophy and Social Injustice
5. Rethinking Gender in Philosophy
6. Balancing Reasons: Obligation in Practical and Theoretical Philosophy

1. Engaging with Philosophy through Popular Media
Supervisor: Michael Quinn

When we watch philosophical films and subsequently reflect on existential themes which they explore, can we be said to be doing philosophy? This project invites students to investigate how audiences might engage with philosophical ideas through popular media such as film, TV, literature, gaming or art. Some scholars are sceptical that popular media can go beyond basic examples of philosophy, whereas others argue that features of certain media are philosophically valuable. For instance, visual artistry in films like The Matrix may encourage reflections on how we distinguish between dreams and reality.

Working with their supervisor, students choose case studies to consider how far popular media can engage audiences in philosophical reflection. Students may examine how films such as Memento explore memory, or evaluate limitations of understanding philosophy through popular media, considering difficulties in presenting complex ideas (eg. freewill and determinism) through examples such as Jostein Gaarder’s Sophie’s World, or TV shows like Lost.

Indicative preliminary reading

• Brighouse, H. and L. Glueck. 2008. ‘Philosophy in the Teaching of Children’s Literature’ in Philosophy on the School Curriculum, ed. by M. Hand and C. Winstanley (Continuum), pp. 119–31.
• Conroy, J. 2008. ‘Philosophy, wisdom and reading great books’ in Philosophy in Schools, ed. by M. Hand (Continuum), pp. 145–57
• MacAllister, J. 2023.‘On the potential in film for ethics education: in defence of educational ethicism’, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 57L, pp. 257–75
• Matthews, G. 1976. ‘Philosophy and Children’s Literature,’ Metaphilosophy, 7, pp.7–16.
• Quinn, M. 2025. ‘Learning Andy Clark & David Chalmers’ ‘The Extended Mind’ through Christopher Nolan’s Memento'. Journal of Philosophy of Education. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhaf081
• Spiegel, T.J. 2024. ‘Can video games be philosophical?’, Synthese, 203.5, pp. 1-19.
• Wartenberg, T. E. 2007.Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy (Routledge)

2. Understanding Misinformation: Perspectives from Philosophy
Supervisor: Guillaume Andrieux

Misinformation is a social and political concern of our age. This project invites students to investigate misinformation from a social epistemic perspective, focusing on how we learn from (and trust) others.

Working with their supervisor, students may design their project from various angles. They may re-examine our preconceptions about misinformation, as recent research suggests that this phenomenon extends beyond outright lies to include misleading truths and strategic omissions. For example, an accurate crime statistic presented without mentioning that overall crime rates are falling might be misinformation. Students may also explore effects on communities as misinformation can prevent audiences from getting knowledge and disrupt their ability to evaluate evidence. Or projects may research why prolonged exposure to misinformation can erode trust in media, scientific or democratic institutions.
Case studies can provide valuable examples, and students are above all encouraged to approach their projects through philosophical methods: clarifying key concepts, organising distinctions and developing a theoretical argument.

Indicative preliminary reading

• Bernecker, S. et al. (eds). 2021. ‘Introduction’, in The Epistemology of Fake News (Oxford University Press), doi:10.1093/oso/9780198863977.003.0001
• Hannon, M. and J. de Ridder (eds). 2021. The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology (Routledge), doi:10.4324/9780429326769 [Especially Part 3]
• Harris, K. R. 2023. ‘Beyond Belief: On Disinformation and Manipulation’, Erkenntnis, 90.2, pp. 483–503, doi:10.1007/s10670-023-00710-6
• Harris, K. R. 2022. ‘Real Fakes: The Epistemology of Online Misinformation’, Philosophy & Technology, 35.3, doi:10.1007/s13347-022-00581-9
• Nguyen, C. T. 2020. ‘Echo Chambers and Epistemic Bubbles’, Episteme, 17.2, pp. 141–61, doi:10.1017/epi.2018.32
• Ridder, J. de. 2024. ‘What’s so Bad about Misinformation?’, Inquiry, 67.9, pp. 2956–78, doi:10.1080/0020174X.2021.2002187
• Weatherall, J. O. and C. O’Connor. 2024. ‘Fake News!’, Philosophy Compass, 19.6, doi:10.1111/phc3.13005

3. The Philosophy of Trusting Chat GPT
Supervisor: Giorgia Foti

‘How do you know?’ ‘Chat GPT told me!’ People increasingly get their knowledge from Large Language Models (LLMs) such as Chat GPT. This project invites students to examine whether and how we should trust information produced by such LLMs.

Students may explore accessible real-world cases (from their own experience and from scholarly literature) in which ChatGPT may be seen to invent references, answer confidently but incorrectly, or accept false assumptions in a question. Examples can be examined through key philosophical ideas in social epistemology (the study of how we share knowledge), including trust, testimony, reliability and epistemic vigilance. Working with their supervisor, students may compare information from ChatGPT with human testimony: are they similar or importantly different? Alternatively, projects may use philosophical methods to consider whether a non-human agent can be held accountable for outputs, and whether norms governing human communication should be extended, revised, or abandoned when dealing with non-human communicative systems like ChatGPT.

Indicative preliminary reading

• Freiman, O. 2024. ‘Analysis of Beliefs Acquired from a Conversational AI: Instruments-based Beliefs, Testimony-based Beliefs, and Technology-based Beliefs’, Episteme, 21.3, pp. 1031–1047. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2023.12
• He, J. and C. Yang. 2025. ‘Testimony by LLMs’, AI & Society. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-025-02366-y
• Hicks, M.T. et al. 2024. ‘ChatGPT is bullshit’, Ethics Inf Technol 26.38. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-024-09775-5
• Nagel, J. 2014. Knowledge: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press). Chapter 6 on Testimony
• O’Connor, C. et al. 2024. ‘Social Epistemology’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2024 Edition), ed. by E. N. Zalta and U. Nodelman. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/epistemology-social/
• Weiser, B. 2023. ‘Here’s what happens when your lawyer uses ChatGPT’. New York Times, May 23, 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/27/nyregion/avianca-airline-lawsuit-chatgpt.html.
• Zhang. M. et al. 2023. ‘How language model hallucinations can snowball’. ArXiv preprint: https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.13534

4. Philosophy and Social Injustice
Supervisor: Han Edgoose

This project invites students to investigate the role of epistemic injustice in a contemporary social issue of their choosing. Epistemic injustice, as first outlined by Miranda Fricker, occurs when a person is ‘wronged in their capacity as a knower’. Knowers may have their testimony wrongfully disregarded or downgraded because of stereotypes (eg. women in STEM may not be respected as experts), or knowers may struggle to understand or communicate experiences without access to appropriate shared language (eg. asexual people may not know that ‘asexual’ is something they could be).

Philosophers have applied the concept of epistemic injustice widely to explore issues including responses to the Black Lives Matter Movement and discrimination in healthcare settings. Working with their supervisor, students investigate the phenomenon of epistemic injustice, and may examine case studies relating to particular forms of epistemic injustice/oppression, such as credibility excess (by which dominant groups may be accorded undeserved authority), or silencing of oppressed voices.

Indicative preliminary reading

• Atkins, A. 2019. ‘Black Lives Matter or All Lives Matter? Color-Blindness and Epistemic Injustice’, Social Epistemology, 33.1, pp. 1–22, doi:10.1080/02691728.2018.1483879
• Davis, E. 2018. ‘On Epistemic Appropriation’, Ethics, 128.4, pp. 702–27, doi:10.1086/697490
• Dotson, K. 2011. ‘Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing’, Hypatia, 26.2, pp. 236–57, doi:10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01177.x
• Fricker, M. 2007. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford University Press)
• Fricker, M. and K. Jenkins. 2017. ‘Epistemic Injustice, Ignorance, and Trans Experiences’, in The Routledge Companion to Feminist Philosophy, ed. by A. Garry, S. J. Khader, and A. Stone (Routledge), pp. 268–78
• Mason, R. 2011. ‘Two Kinds of Unknowing’, Hypatia, 26.2, pp. 294–307, doi:10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01175.x
• Walmsley, J. 2023. ‘“Computer Says No” Artificial Intelligence, Gender Bias, and Epistemic Injustice’, in Feminist Philosophy and Emerging Technologies, ed. by M. L. Edwards and S. O. Palermos (Routledge), doi:10.4324/9781003275992

5. Rethinking Gender in Philosophy
Supervisor: Annalisa Muscolo

What is ‘gender’? What does it mean to be a ‘woman’? In a respectful environment, this project explores debates surrounding the meaning of ‘woman’ and how philosophy should conceptualise gender. Working with their supervisor, students will engage with foundational and recent scholarship in feminist philosophy, drawing from real-life examples, to explore key philosophical and political questions about the fundamental nature of gender.

Students may choose to consider, for instance, how to avoid essentialist definitions that overlook intersectional diversity and differences in experience or social position; how to theorise gender by centring trans and non-binary identities; how to think about gender categories and their theoretical and political roles in a way that is inclusive of all who identify as a certain gender, and is attentive to both oppressive and emancipatory practices. Students will investigate ways in which philosophical theories might reconcile inclusivity with conceptual clarity, and how gender categories might be socially grounded and politically empowering.

Indicative preliminary reading

• Ásta (Sveinsdóttir). 2018. Categories We Live By: The Construction of Sex, Gender, Race, and Other Social Categories (Oxford University Press)
• Barnes, E. 2022. ‘Gender without Gender Identity: The Case of Cognitive Disability’, Mind, 131.523, pp. 838–864
• Dembroff, R. 2020. ‘Beyond Binary: Genderqueer as Critical Gender Kind’ [English], Philosopher’s Imprint 20 (9):1-23
• Haslanger, S. 2000. ‘Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them To Be?’, Noûs, 34.1, pp. 31–55
• Jenkins, K. 2016. ‘Amelioration and Inclusion: Gender Identity and the Concept of Woman’, Ethics, 126.2, pp. 394–421
• Jenkins, K. 2022. ‘How to be a Pluralist about Gender Categories’, in The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings, 8th edn, ed. by R. Halwani et al., pp. 233–259
• Jenkins, K. et al. 2025. ‘Feminist Metaphysics’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2025 Edition), ed. by E. N. Zalta and U. Nodelman
  https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2025/entries/feminism-metaphysics/

6. Balancing Reasons: Obligation in Practical and Theoretical Philosophy
Supervisor: Pinelopi Stylianopoulou

When deliberating about what to do, how should we decide? This project invites students to explore normative reasons for belief and action. Reasons play a key role in our rational economy, underpinning most aspects of belief formation and decision-making. However, not all reasons carry equal weight: my reason for leaving the house to go for a run may be outweighed by a promise I made to stay at home.
According to a philosophical view, what we ought to do depends entirely on the balance of reasons for incompatible alternatives. Working with their supervisor, students are invited to critically reflect on this view, and ask whether it captures our intuitions about obligation in different types of deliberation. For instance, students may examine reasons for action more broadly, or focus specifically on reasons for belief or theoretical reasoning. Students may explore obligation and related normative notions in different philosophical areas, then consider specific arguments as they develop their individual projects.

Indicative preliminary reading

• Alvarez, M. 2024. ‘Reasons for Action: Justification, Motivation, Explanation’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/reasons-just-vs-expl/
• Broome, J. 1999. ‘Normative Requirements’, Ratio, 12.4, pp. 398–419, doi:10.1111/1467-9329.00101.
• Gert, J. 2007. ‘Normative Strength and the Balance of Reasons’, The Philosophical Review, 116.4, pp. 533–62, doi:10.1215/00318108-2007-013.
• Harman, G. 1986. Change in View: Principles of Reasoning (MIT Press).
• Schmidt, T. 2024. ‘The Balancing View of Ought’, Ethics, 134.2, pp. 246–267, doi:10.1086/727270.
• Stebbing, S. 2025. ‘Thinking’, Susan Stebbing: Philosophical Papers, ed. by Siobhan Chapman (Oxford University Press), pp. 169–182.
• Tucker, C. 2025. ‘Weighing Reasons’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/weighing-reasons/

This course aims to:

• Provide an opportunity to undertake an independent research project in the Humanities under supervision.
• Introduce approaches to research and analysis in the Humanities
• Develop professional skills in research and analysis and transferable skills in oral and written argument.

 By the end of this course you will be able to:

• Assess scholarly literature and available sources to formulate a viable research question in the Humanities
• Contextualise and critically analyse sources to produce a convincing argument
• Express analysis and argument in written and oral forms

Weekly seminars specific to humanities (these may include group visits to the Glasgow University and Hunterian collections, as well as the course conference) and twice weekly supervisor meetings.

• GPA of 3.0 (or equivalent)
• you should be currently enrolled at an international higher education institution.
• two years of study in university-level Humanities courses with a major or minor in a relevant subject (Applicants who have only attended university for one year will be considered if strong performance in a relevant Humanities subject can be demonstrated).

If your first language is not English, you must meet our minimum proficiency level:

• International English Language Testing System (IELTS) Academic module (not General Training) overall score of 6.0, with no sub test less than 5.5
• we also accept equivalent scores in other recognised qualifications such as ibTOEFL, CAE, CPE and more.

This is a guide, for further information email internationalsummerschools@gla.systa-s.com